Review Essays

Is There an Addiction to Sex and Love?

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This is a book directed at both professional and nonprofessional audiences. It takes the view that sex and love addiction will be the “disease of the 90s.” Griffin-Shelley’s intent is to help those in clinical practice identify and assist the sex and love addicts who make up their patient load and to provide hope and direction for those suffering from this long-ignored addiction” (p. 1). Drawing on his training and experience in the area of chemical dependency and his work with Sex and Love Addicts Anonymous (S.L.A.A.), Griffin-Shelley is committed to the need to be sensitive to the pain and suffering of sex and love addicts.

The book is filled with examples from Griffin-Shelley’s own practice, which make for fascinating reading in themselves. His bibliography, however, is meager and fails to mention any books adapted to women. The opening chapters define sex and love addiction as “an enslavement to an activity, person, or thing that is characterized by imbalance, lack of control, loss of power, distortion of values, inflexible centralness to the person’s life, unhealthiness, pathology, chronicity, progression and potential fatality” (p. 8). He offers detailed diagnostic criteria, including the following list of nine characteristics of sex and love addiction: the high, tolerance, dependence, craving, withdrawal, obsession, compulsion, secrecy, and personality change. Central to Griffin-Shelley’s text is his reliance on and defense of the
disease model of addiction as illness. The disease model stipulates that something can be considered a disease if we can identify and define the following categories: symptoms, etiology, course/progression, treatment, and response. Griffin-Shelley applies this model to love and sex addiction, drawing many parallels between addiction and such chronic illnesses as diabetes and depression.

The last two chapters describe short- and long-term treatment and recovery. Griffin-Shelley draws on Ernie Larson’s (1985) writings about the two stages of recovery from chemical dependency in *Stage II Recovery—Life beyond Addiction*. Griffin-Shelley also conceptualizes these two dimensions of treatment and recovery in terms of the addiction cycle outlined by Patrick Carnes (1983) in his book *Out of the Shadows*. Short-term treatment and recovery focuses on achieving sobriety in sex and love by means of a 12-step program that originated with Alcoholics Anonymous more than 50 years ago. Long-term recovery begins once initial sobriety has been established and focuses on probing how the addict’s family of origin and other environmental and genetic factors are active in the disease process.

Griffin-Shelley defends himself against the major objection that calling something a disease somehow takes away the responsibility from the suffering individual. He explains that the objection is founded on a misunderstanding of the Twelve Step recovery program. He maintains that those who advocate the disease model do not allow the addict to avoid responsibility for the illness. Rather, the goal is to become free from dependencies of any kind, not to create “rigid, mindless, dependent, and helpless robots” (p. 45). Griffin-Shelley rigorously defends the Twelve Step program against the criticism that the addict’s initial surrender leads to a simple transfer of dependencies from the addiction to the recovery group. However, he does not address the potential for exploitation in these groups, just as in real families. Griffin-Shelley states that the “we” in the Twelve Step program “symbolizes the fellowship of recovering people” and that recovery “is not an ‘I’ program,” but rather it is a “we” program (p. 93). What is the identity of the “we”? What is the gender, ethnicity, and class of this “we”? Gloria Steinem (1992, 179) points out that many such groups, especially for eating disorders, now have so many women members that they have rewritten the 12 steps to better suit the needs of women with too little ego.

Griffin-Shelley contributes to the literature on this new area of addictionology by advocating a wholistic approach to understanding the subjectivity of the addict, one that takes into consideration the
“overall ecology” of therapy and recovery (pp. 55, 90). He maintains that sex and love addiction affects the physical, mental, emotional, social, and spiritual aspects of the whole person. Griffin-Shelley’s treatment and recovery programs are based on an approach that affirms the overall ecology of the recovery process and how the various components work together in the addict’s life.

Although I have nothing but sympathy for Griffin-Shelley’s wholistic, ecological approach, I have concerns about the way that he expresses it. My first concern is that although Griffin-Shelley tries not to be dualistic, chapters 2 and 3 inadvertently express themselves in a dualistic style that reinforces the very problems it is trying to solve. In his discussion of dependence, for instance, Griffin-Shelley first explains and lists examples of physical dependence, followed by examples of psychological dependence. He maintains that “it should not be too hard for us to see that sex and love addiction involves a dependency that is both physical and psychological” (p. 14). However, it is the meaning of the word “both” in this context that worries me. “Both” seems to mean “in addition to,” implying that physical and psychological concerns belong to separate realms. Griffin-Shelley uses this phrasing throughout the first third of the book (pp. 12, 14, 16-17, 20, 55-68).

My second concern is that Griffin-Shelley’s ecological approach to the recovery process relies on a limited notion of “environment.” Griffin-Shelley’s claim that “we are all interdependent on each other and our environment” (p. 6) puts him in the good company of some current feminist epistemologists, albeit from diverse theoretical positions, in advocating that we conceive of personhood along ecological lines (e.g., Code 1996, 1987; Baier 1991, 1985). However, his text and examples focus on the limited environment of the addict’s personal relationships, upbringing, and family. Lorraine Code (1996) provides a more useful conception of environment as the “complex network of relations within which an organism strives to realize its potential, be those relations social, historical, material, geographical, cultural . . . institutional, or other” (p. 12).

My third concern is with Griffin-Shelley’s central term “power.” Sometimes, Griffin-Shelley speaks of power as a control that addicts have or do not have over their sexual or romantic thoughts, feelings, and behavior (p. 95). At other times, he suggests that power resides in the addictives, sex and love (p. 86), and moreover, power is God, something other and greater than ourselves (p. 97). Yet, nowhere in the text does he explain just how he conceives of power. What seems
to interest him more, in fact, is “powerlessness.” He explains that powerlessness is inside the person and unmanageability is outside (p. 97). Griffin-Shelley’s distinction between the inside (thoughts, feelings, impulses, needs, and wants) and the outside (actions, social and coping skills, relating to the environments, and the external world of the sex and love addict) is problematic for any ecological model that relies on reciprocity between the social-political-natural world and the ecological subject (Code 1996, 13). Hence, it would have been helpful, at least to this reader, had Griffin-Shelley done more to explain his choice of terminology and been more explicit about his use of such concepts as “power” and “ecology.”

Griffin-Shelley’s uncertain stance on the question of power is part, in fact, of a greater unclarity that pervades the text: it is unclear where he stands on the issue of the power that society has to manufacture, produce, and maintain sex and love addiction. In the introduction to his book, Griffin-Shelley wonders “if we are not somehow becoming an addicted society” (p. 2). Yet, his discussion of the social and cultural aspects of love and sex addiction is limited to sparse and benign remarks. He mentions that social and cultural expectation is a barrier to self-affirmation (p. 162) but does not discuss the ways in which these expectations are socially and culturally sanctioned. He explains that sex and love addicts “grow up with an unspoken set of core beliefs” without discussing the role that society and culture plays in this learning process. Griffin-Shelley devotes only two sentences to discussing our “addictive society” as an environmental factor in the illness of addiction. He writes,

“Even if a person grows up in a healthy family without abuse or neglect, our culture’s current emphasis on immediate gratification, on the quick fix and the ‘easy buck,’ grooms us to become addicted. In addition, our tendency to overvalue sex and underestimate the relational aspects of love makes us vulnerable to developing compulsive, ritualized, obsessive preoccupations with sex and love.” (p. 143)

Griffin-Shelley’s gloss on this crucial subject raises many questions: What role does this productive social and cultural power play in the sex and love addict’s experience of his or her illness, therapy, and recovery? What sorts of social divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums make love and sex addiction possible? What forms of resistance are available to a sex and love addict against these fundamental social structures, institutions, and systemic values? These sorts of questions will get answers only if the crucial notion of power can be clarified.
The inadequate discussion of the social and cultural aspects of love and sex addiction leads to the following worrisome slippages in the text. Griffin-Shelley uses an ambiguous choice of words in his final chapter in the context of giving an example of how family issues can become relevant to the long-term recovery of a sex and love addict. Griffin-Shelley explains that an addict’s parents never visited him in his inner-city home, and he [the addict] was afraid to ask them because he anticipated their horror at the knowledge that he lived in a neighborhood that was largely black. They would not see his neighborhood as a consequence of his sex and love addiction. (P. 177)

This ambiguity is a result of a gap in the text concerning any racial issues that may surround love and sex addiction. This reader is left wondering how ethnicity and love and sex addiction interrelate. Rape is sexualized in another unfortunate choice of wording in the second chapter. Griffin-Shelley writes the following about the case of the “Boston Strangler”: “His [the Boston Strangler’s] story kept coming back to me.... In order to satisfy his growing hunger for sex, he began to rape women.... When rape was no longer enough of a sexual high, he began to murder his victims” (p. 27). Now Griffin-Shelley is not, I think, arguing that rape is a sexual act rather than an act of violence. Yet, the text suggests that rape was, for the Boston Strangler, a matter of satisfying his sexual urges rather than committing acts of violence against women. Again, this reader is left wondering about the connections between gender and love and sex addiction.

Finally, despite Griffin-Shelley’s qualifying comments and democratic intentions, his discussion of “mothering” and “fathering” in the context of long-term treatment and recovery has an essentializing ring to it. Griffin-Shelley encourages his readers to “use the idea that is most comfortable” and that “in order to be whole, healthy, balanced, happy, and fulfilled, we need all these aspects [adult, parent, child, nurturing, and disciplining] of ourselves to be alive, functioning, and working together” (p. 192). However, he uses the term “fathering” interchangeably with “disciplining” and “mothering” with “nurturing.” Griffin-Shelley’s definitions of a “good” father and mother and the “job” of a mother and father perpetuate stereotypical concepts of gender or sex role behavior, despite his claims that he is discussing the generic activities of nurturing and disciplining (pp. 192-93). These textual inconsistencies perhaps betray the need for clarification of Griffin-Shelley’s understanding of the gendered and
racial nature of love and sex addiction with which he is working. Despite my caveats, I highly recommend Griffin-Shelley’s book for its ecological approach to therapy and recovery, its attempt at viewing the subjectivity of the sex and love addict wholistically, and its compelling cases and accounts.

NOTES

1. For an excellent book directed at the sex and love addict and nonprofessional audience that does not officially speak for any 12-step organization, see Schaeffer (1987). Schaeffer’s closing chapter “Helping Yourself Out of Addiction” consists of a series of practical and helpful exercises providing skills that allow addicts to act as their own therapists and to address their relationship problems in a helpful, hopeful way.
2. For a discussion of addiction adapted to women, see Kasl (1989).
3. This worry echoes Evan Thompson’s worry about the biopsychosocial approach to illness. Quoted with permission from Thompson (1995, 2).
4. Ibid.
5. For an insightful analysis of how these structures exercise power, see Michel Foucault (1978).

REFERENCES

Thompson, E. 1995. The mindful body: A new metaphor for biomedicine. (paper presented to the symposium “Understanding the Patient’s Illness Experience,” Faculty of Medicine, University of Western Ontario, 6 October 1995).
The flow of work on nationalism threatens now to inundate even the avid reader of it and forces one to ask whether in its wake we have gained a beachhead or lost all ground on which to stand. I shall in this article address several recent collections of articles on nationalism (listed above), the quality of which on the whole is remarkably high and the outcome of which is an advance on the topic on several fronts. The articles in these collections are often overlapping and at times actually repeated. For example, Charles Taylor’s “Nationalism and Modernity” appears in three collections; Miroslav Hroch, Michael Walzer, Will Kymlicka, and others are represented more than once by different pieces; and, expectedly, contributions by or references to Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, and Anthony Smith recur throughout. Yet, these repetitions and recurrences are constructive indications that certain positions or theorists are accepted as focal points for current discussion.

However, I shall organize this stocktaking article around not names but issues or questions, in particular five, or five sets, which...
blend into each other and could be ordered in alternative ways. The questions are the following: (1) Why for long was nationalism ignored, and why exactly is it now front and center for theorists? Has reality so dramatically changed, or have theories of it, or both? (2) Is nationalism a phenomenon of modernity or perhaps also, in some manner, an ancient one? (3) What indeed is nationalism and what are nations? Is nationalism a name for some single phenomenon? And, crucially, whether singular or plural, is the object of inquiry—nations and nationalism—at root real or contrived, “imagined” perhaps, in Benedict Anderson’s memorable phrase? Insofar as some provisional sense of our subject matter is needed from the start I would say this: nationalism is meant those sentiments or movements whereby people of a presumed common culture or some other such element of commonality seek on that basis to establish or maintain a state, or a lesser form of political autonomy, or at least a set of special rights. Obviously, the numerous elements and alternations in this provisional definition leave essentials to be clarified. Thus, for example, (4) What of the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism? Do these indicate genuine and important alternatives or a false dichotomy? (5) Close to the previous question, but not coextensive with it, What of the notion of liberal nationalism? Is it a self-consistent and perhaps important category or an oxymoron? What in any event should be the stance of liberalism or liberal-democracy toward nationalism? I take it that that question puts things in the right order of priority, in other words, that liberalism and democracy are the fixed moral points with which nationalism must be reconciled or for the sake of which it must be rejected.

The foregoing is obviously a large and ambitious agenda. My coverage of it, in five sections below, will necessarily be less concerned to provide systematic analyses or answers on all points than indications of the state of the present discussion and of what seems promising and what not. I shall, though, seek to focus on certain themes throughout, and it is best to note at the outset what some of these are and what orientation guides my reading of recent work on nationalism or emerges from it.

I believe that nationalism is only now properly coming into view for us, in part because various and often extreme developments connected to nationalism have unfolded and also because theories and assessments of nationalism have been purged of at least certain misconceptions or one-sided appraisals. It is rare now, for example, to find anyone as categorical as say Kedourie (1960) was, who looked on
nationalism from the aspect of its darkest manifestations and saw it as a tissue of error rooted in a false and inflated philosophical notion of self-determination, spawned, supposedly, by Kant; or even someone as decisive in a different way about nationalism as was Lord Acton in 1862 (“Nationality,” in Balakrishnan), for whom nations were not at all proper grounds for states but for whom states must instead be multinational, which may seem a laudable judgment, but in Acton’s case it reflected the all-too-confident perspective of an imperialistically inclined liberalism and the presumption that some cultures are unarguably inferior and defective such that they must be adjoined to and tutored by other superior ones. Attitudes toward nationalism now tend to be more mixed or nuanced, with both the moral and the political options being more varied (John Dunn, “Nationalism,” in Beiner, p. 42). As well, and of deeper significance, there is a greater appreciation of nationalism’s motivations and cultural dimensions, a greater sensitivity to the interpretive and evaluative elements connected to social identity and shared traditions which (apparently) form nationalism and to which (apparently) it in turn gives form and political shape in ways that may be at least partly positive as well as negative.

With nationalism as with social-political phenomena generally, normative and empirical questions are necessarily intertwined, and to get proper normative bearings we must first have some sound explanatory bearings. To know what to condone and what to condemn about nationalism, we require an understanding of what generates nationalist sentiments or movements and of their relation to economic developments, political systems, and so forth. This requirement does not imply moral relativism but simply a need to ground judgments on proper facts. Any suggestion that we could or should, from a philosopher’s armchair, simply focus concepts and determine analytically which ideas and principles of nationalism are as such meaningful and morally tenable is evidently naive; and what is needed must extend beyond an awareness of actual occurrences of nationalism to include some grasp of their causes and effects. Of course, the evils of Nazism and various other movements or policies are plainly identifiable and damnable whatever their exact origins and associations, but to determine whether or how nationalism is significantly involved, we would need some theoretical understanding of it. Not only is evaluation thus contingent on some measure of explanation but so as well is even identification or description: to know what we have before us, to classify it properly and usefully, requires seeing
its connections to other phenomena (which is why I propose to investi-
gate, via question 2, the explanatory issue of nationalism in relation
to modernity before asking head-on, with question 3, what national-
ism is or what nations are).

It is encouraging that nationalism is increasingly being studied if
not jointly by philosophers and social scientists then at least in a man-
ner which reveals on both sides an awareness of work on the other.
But I shall maintain that both camps still need, partly through greater
interaction between them, an enhanced sense of how to understand
nationalism as a distinctively cultural phenomenon and indeed of
how to understand such phenomena generally; that, I believe, is what
for long was lacking and is only now beginning to be filled in. With
these remarks, though, I encroach on the first of our five questions.

1. Taking Nationalism Seriously: Why Only Now?

The recent interest in and spate of work on nationalism is unques-
tionably to some extent a function of objective events and trends: the
breakup of the Soviet Union; the explosion of ethnic and secessionist
movements in Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, and Southeast
Asia; plus the continuing situation in Northern Ireland, the height-
ened separatist pressures in Scotland and Quebec, and an increased
sense generally of the so-called politics of identity. But it is actually
hard to gauge whether nationalism is truly more present or more
intensely present than before, and whatever the current extent of it,
the phenomenon of nationalism, even if in ways below the surface, of
course goes back much beyond a few decades. What is more, the attri-
bution of recent theoretical interest exclusively to actual develop-
ments misses something truly fundamental, namely, that what we are
witnessing are attempts at understanding a reality which had no due
place in the major political theories of modern times, meaning of
course Marxism and liberalism. For both, nationalism was mostly an
anomaly, or embarrassment, or incidental and transitional stage, or
even an epiphenomenon. The crucial differences between Marxism
and liberalism on this subject, as in general, must not be minimized,
especially those connected to liberalism’s inherent capacity to toler-
ate, if not welcome, expressions of nationalism by means of its struc-
ture of moral-political rights, a structure which Marxism at core set
itself against. But acknowledging that nationalism was at odds with
the basic thrust of both liberalism and Marxism is essential to diag-
nosing both their limits and its nature. The obstacle to liberalism’s
comprehending, and hence properly evaluating, nationalism is not as such the individualistic thrust of liberalism but rather something else which Marxism, anti- or nonindividualistic as it is, shares with liberalism. What is that shared obstacle to understanding?

Brian Barry (“Self-Government Revisited,” in Beiner) brings out not quite the thing we are looking for but an important associated problem about the theoretical basis of liberalism, whether that basis be utilitarianism, contractarianism (i.e., social contract theory), or natural rights. Such theoretical orientations tell us, he points out, why there should be government and what government should be for but not really by or for whom and within the context of what territory. The designation of “the people” is not addressed or is simply taken for granted. General notions of utility maximization, bargaining strategy, or pure reason soar above such things. To this, we must add that Marxism notoriously proclaimed that the proletariat have no country but only an identity and interests as a class—hence, an identity in international terms, something which actual workers have repeatedly resisted in their attitudes and actions (and Marxism in consequence vacillated between denying nationalism and embracing it belatedly as the bearer of liberation). Thus, the socially and historically unmediated individual who figures in the standard image of liberalism and the similarly unmediated member of a class who figures in the standard image of Marxism seem equally unsuited characters for identities defined in key part by culturally contingent though perhaps crucially significant particulars. So, whether seeing the world in some way through nationalist lenses is morally valid or not, what emerges as the essential obstacle even to acknowledging and understanding the phenomenon is that the theoretical and explanatory frameworks adopted by liberalism and also by Marxism have essentially been cast in terms of either exceedingly abstract norms and aims or overly concrete, interest-based ones, neither of which options, nor any mere mix of them, seems to allow for the intermediate-level concepts and concerns which nationalist sentiments and attachments express, however exactly these are to be analyzed. The indicated theoretical lacuna covers the whole space that would be occupied by ethnicity, religion, nationalism, language, and numerous other factors, including conceptions of gender, in all: culture, where that means, in broad terms, sets of values, attitudes, and orientations tied to distinctive histories and traditions. The essentially familiar point I am making can be stated in terms of the Enlightenment’s expectations and actual outcomes. The Enlightenment, for which liberalism is the cata-
lyst and political articulation and on which Marxism was built, was to signal a time when all such interpretive veils as religion, tradition, and culture generally would be lifted and set aside, which of course is far from what happened. But the result was that the major social-political theories of modernity were unequipped to cope with the result. Only with the continuing recalcitrance of the phenomena over time were liberal, and Marxist, theories forced to rethink fundamentals, in part by drawing on historical and sociological analyses and in part by altering and enlarging their own conceptual frameworks. Charles Taylor is a justly seminal thinker on nationalism partly because he looks for light on the topic not from Locke, Kant, or Mill (1972), who could have selective sympathies for nationalist causes but offered no theoretical focus for comprehending them or appreciating cultural differences, and instead draws on Herder and Humboldt and in ways Hegel. But what follows from such leads; where does one go with them? A similar question can be asked with regard to the influence of communitarianism in recent decades. Its concerns or approach may seem to be of the sort I was calling for but in fact may be very different. The problem is that some of the major thinkers from the past thus drawn on, and in any case the theoretical directions taken in the present may involve not properly comprehending nationalism in the needed manner, as a phenomenon of history and culture, but instead misrepresenting it in ways opposite to those of liberalism and Marxism and in ways whose practical consequences can be far worse. I refer to the tendency to bring nationalism under theoretical consideration not by treating it as a cultural fact but instead as a naturalistic one, the tendency in other words to link nationalism to basic human instincts or needs and to presume that there is a national destiny, or form of flowering, to which all people as a people must aspire. There are echoes of this in the conservative nationalism of Roger Scruton (“The First Person Plural,” in Beiner). Such naturalistic renderings of nationalism can conceivably take on benign forms, but they can also of course sow the seeds of malignant ones.

So the issue as it emerges from our first question is the following: given that nationalism has only recently come to be an important item on the theoretical agenda because of its continuing or increasing manifestation as a factor of culture in the face of theories inherently unsuited to address such factors, what must now be the terms of understanding it and ultimately evaluating it? And what terms are now being proposed? Marxism having for the most part played itself
out through massive moral and political failures, the question can best be pursued in relation to liberal or associated (conservative and communitarian) points of view and further investigated by taking up the next question on our agenda.

2. Nationalism and Modernity?

Much of the theorizing during the past several decades has centered on this question; numerous articles in the collections under discussion address it. The issue in essence is whether nationalism is specifically connected to features of the modern world and the transformation that made for it, such as industrialization, the emergence of a market economy, the development of technology, and so forth, and the transition from a political world of empires and feudal powers to one of states; or whether nationalism is rooted in and similar to institutions and forms of social belonging that go way back: families, tribes, and the like. This is the issue on which Ernest Gellner famously weighed in, beginning in the 1960s and continuing through his last years (to his death in 1995). An important late paper appears in Balakrishnan (see note 3), and the collection by Hall and Jarvie (1996) devoted to Gellner’s theory is an invaluable engagement with both his views and the whole topic.3

It was Gellner’s insight that nationalism is integrally related to industrialization but is so in a way which seems to capture the cultural dimension of nationalism. His approach is materialist but not Marxist, functionalist but, it seems, not narrowly economist. He writes not as a friend of nationalism but as a realist about it. In his view, industrialization requires the pervasiveness in a society of a “high” culture, that is, a culture of literacy which is formal, technical, and transmitted by education. Such a culture is centered in a distinctive language, as a standardized means of mutual understanding, but reaches beyond it to ways of orienting and comporting oneself in a mobile world which demands facility in communication and adaptability. All this is different from the agrarian world of the past in which there was a high “script” culture which was the property of the few and an oral, tradition-based peasant culture of songs and folkways for the many. At the core of the transformation from agrarian to industrial society is the change whereby work ceases to be mainly physical and becomes instead semantic. Nations are the units of shared culture suited to this and as such are not natural but culturally contingent and must be forged to serve the interests of industrializa-
tion and modernization. The refinements of Gellner’s theory stressed in the paper in Balakrishnan and in his “Reply to Critics” in Hall and Jarvie (1996) are important for blunting certain common criticisms but also for revealing in ways the force of them or others. One criticism is that Gellner never really explains adequately the transition(s) from nationalism, as spawned by industrialization, to nation-states, that is, the crucial political dimension of nationalism (Brendan O’Leary, “Ernest Gellner’s Diagnoses of Nationalism: A Critical Overview, or, What Is Living and What Is Dead in Ernest Gellner’s Philosophy of Nationalism?” in Hall, p. 65; and Michael Mann, “The Emergence of Modern European Nationalism,” in Hall and Jarvie 1996). The reply in part is that, as was cited above (see note 3), a key point for Gellner is that nationalism supplies the units—the (supposedly) homogeneous linguistic-cultural units within a given geographical context—to which political principles, for example of sovereignty and popular government, come to be applied. But this leaves in question, among other things, why some nationalisms actually do lead to the formation of states while others do not and also why and how the types of states connected to nationalism can be so varied in character, ranging from liberal and democratic to totalitarian. What Gellner has to say on this, by way of different methods being adopted in different cases for dealing with anomalies to the principle “one culture—one state,” methods which range from the relatively benign (integration or assimilation) to the outright murderous (“ethnic cleansing” and “the final solution”), remains strikingly incomplete or begs crucial questions. Concerning the development of nationalism in Germany and its culmination in Nazism—surely something of a test case for theories of nationalism without having to be a paradigm for them—Gellner says,

This virulent style of nationalism, going so far beyond that which is merely required by the need for culturally homogeneous, internally mobile socio-political unity (that is nation-states), reflects and expresses what one might call the Poetry of Unreason. Communality, discipline, hierarchy and ruthlessness are good, and constitute the true fulfillment of human needs, not despite the fact that they are anti-rational, but because they are such. (Balakrishnan, P. 121; and similarly Gellner 1997, P. 70)

Indeed. Now, whether Gellner is at all right about the specific intellectual roots and cultural sources of Nazism which he cites (namely, a blend of communal romanticism in Herder and a cult of force associ-
ated with Nietzsche), he is evidently and understandably drawing on an explanation which, by treating traditions of ideas and attitudes as the key, is far removed from his materialist-industrialist model and is instead reminiscent of theories which have focused on longstanding culturally rooted attitudes or ideas, in this case of force and unreason; or, alternatively and perhaps equivalently, on cultural and circumstantial obstacles to the development of (available) currents of liberalism reaching back to the Enlightenment.

So what remains to be filled in, despite Gellner’s best and last efforts, is the whole story of how nationalism in some contexts became the basis for a conception of citizenship which transcends, at least in principle, ethnic and similar differences and so served as an instrument of liberalization (in Britain, the United States, and France, for example) and of how in other contexts radically opposite things happened.

And much else remains in need of explanation concerning still the question of how nationalism links up with modernity or perhaps arises from earlier periods and sources. Anthony Smith’s well-known critique of Gellner and modernization theories of nationalism (1986, 1991; “Nationalism and the Historians,” in Balakrishnan) has one important merit, the other side of which, however, is a major defect. Smith has argued that nationalism is a modern phenomenon which gives specific shape and focus to ancient forms of belonging, to tribal-like ethnic communities which include a sense of shared history, common customs, stories or mythologies, symbols, and so forth. The merit of this view is its emphasis on the rich cultural panoply which is crucial to at least most forms of nationalism (even Britain, the United States, etc. have their stock of historical images, heroes, national celebrations, watershed events or decisions, etc.), a cultural panoply which in Gellner seems almost an afterthought to what does look to be at times a still too materialistic and economistic account of nationalism. However, the defect of Smith’s theory, as John Breuilly points out (“Approaches to Nationalism,” in Balakrishnan, pp. 150-51), is that everything about the distinctively political, legal, and economic role nationalism plays in the modern world, including its link to movements for statehood and the development of massive centralized bureaucracies, figures at best as a supplement and at worst as a blank.

Liah Greenfeld’s (1992) account of nationalism is a variant of the modernization thesis but is importantly different from Gellner’s in placing, as does in ways Hroch’s, the origins of nationalism much
earlier than industrialization and linking it more to the varying political struggles which are early and essential episodes in the origins of modern states: specifically, for example, by way of elites at times calling on “the people,” the English people, say, to further their cause. But as Will Kymlicka points out (“Misunderstanding Nationalism,” in Beiner), this perhaps helps explain the origins of nationalism but not its abiding and powerful presence, especially among nonelites.

Charles Taylor calls on Greenfield and Gellner but seeks something more to answer just such questions while reinforcing, he believes, the central connection between nationalism and modernity. Taylor claims to “plug the explanatory hole” which he finds in theories like Gellner’s and also Anderson’s:

> These told us something about the context of modern nationalist struggles, even about what can make them virtually inevitable. But the sources of nationalist aspirations escaped us. They offered us Hamlet without the prince. ("Nationalism and Modernity," in McKim and McMahan, P. 49)

But Taylor is adamant that nationalism is “very far from atavistic reactions or primal identities” (p. 47), and so rather than revert to a theory like Smith’s, Taylor seeks to draw on additional aspects of the transition to modernity to define the core motive of nationalism. It is to be found, he maintains, in the need for dignity and recognition in a world in which homogenization of identity has become the trend at the same time as what is urgently demanded is acknowledgment by others of one’s social distinctiveness. What Taylor is stressing is that the grounds of identity now lie not in inherited and fixed status but in the construct of social acceptance. Kymlicka ("The Sources of Nationalism: Commentary on Taylor," in McKim and McMahan) thinks this just mystifies something important but plain, namely, the role of language and associated cultural elements for making one’s way in modern society given that governments will have to privilege and in various respects enforce some language and associated elements over others. But if language is made the mainstay of nationalism in modernity, how exactly does it link up with other cultural factors such as social bonds and sets of values and specific orientations? Shared language by itself does not constitute a common culture in the latter, wider sense, as is evident just from differences between the political culture of Canada and that of the United States—a kind of instance which Gellner notes as an anomaly for his view but passes over; nor is
common language necessary to nationalism, as with Zionism among Jews of diverse backgrounds. So it does seem that whatever important headway has been made by the modernists in accounting for nationalism, key questions remain about its character, implications, and intensity.

3. What Then Are Nations, Really?
Are the Objects of Nationalism Real or Contrived?

Demanding a definition of “nation” or “nationalism” may well be fruitless and an instance of an obsession with concepts rather than a constructive concern with facts. Any search for a set of necessary and sufficient conditions will almost surely fail since there are bound to be significant counterexamples to all candidates (Wayne Norman, “Theorizing Nationalism: Normatively (First Steps),” in Beiner, p. 53). What is sensibly called for is something more modest than a fixed definition, namely, a grasp of main elements mostly associated with the term, whether “nation” or “nationalism.” I have of course been leading up to some such view by emphasizing the importance to nations and nationalism of a shared culture in the general sense of attitudes, values, and the like, which are rooted in traditions, confer identities, and point (validly or not) to some form of political implementation. Indeed, I have been suggesting that various and even conflicting theories, when critically pressed, set us in the direction of some such view. But if it is to be usefully filled in and supported, there is an aspect of the definitional question about nations and nationalism that demands above all others to be confronted: namely, are nations somehow real and objective or instead contrived, imagined, invented, or something of the sort? These are of course matters which have attracted much recent discussion involving different answers and different senses of “real,” “invented,” and so forth.

What needs to be understood, I shall contend, is that explaining nations and nationalism as cultural phenomena, as formed in important part out of ideas and beliefs within specific historical contexts, does not imply that they are for that reason, that is, need be, items of fantasy or mere fabrication. The latter are the characteristics of the disturbing and degenerate cases to which a proper cultural analysis can and must alert us.

However, these basic things I am suggesting have often not been correctly grasped. Theorists who have emphasized the modernist
and distinctively historical and cultural characteristics of nationalism have been perhaps especially prone to regard nations as not just created but also in some importance sense as “unreal,” although that outlook can also be arrived at by different and simply dismissive views of nationalism.

The notion that much about actual nationalism is either “invented” or “imagined” is especially associated with, respectively, Hobsbawm and Anderson. Hobsbawm (1990) has done invaluable work by revealing that certain traditions and symbols which are allegedly longstanding and deeply rooted are in fact deliberate and relatively recent creations. As for Anderson, his famous phrasing about nations as imagined was more subtle than any simplistic claim about their being pure fictions, but the suggestion of unreality is there in the claim about nations as objects of belief rather than of observable fact. He writes that the nation is imagined in various senses including “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 1991, 6).

Gellner says interesting and at times opposite things on this topic. One can find him for example wanting to stress the real world, ordinary experience which makes for the sense of nationhood and the relations of nationalism: “The root of nationalism is not ideology, but concrete daily experience”—of social intercourse, work, and so forth (Balakrishnan, p. 123). But in saying this, Gellner was perhaps partly reacting against indications of a contrary sort in his own earlier formulations. And anyway, there is this from his 1996 “Replies to Critics” regarding claims by nationalists about their past, its traditions, and so forth: “My own attitude has tended to be that for the purposes of understanding modern nationalism, it did not matter, that an invented tradition is as good as a ‘real’ one, and vice versa” (Hall and Jarvie 1996, p. 638). In some ways this may be so, but there is a worry here about too loose a connection between belief and fact, of the very sort that can lead to serious unreason.

Consider this in relation to certain other theories of nationalism. For a view of nations and nationalism as unreal and contrived, one may turn to Michael Ignatieff (“Nationalism and the Narcissism of Minor Differences,” in Beiner) and Robert Goodin (“Conventions and Conversions, or, Why Is Nationalism Sometimes So Nasty?” in McKim and McMahan). Ignatieff thinks that while nationalism arises at times out of the real concern for self-defense in the face of collapsing
regimes, whereby people in such situations latch onto kith and kin, their doing so involves magnifying the most insignificant of differences into important oppositions, a syndrome which is best understood, according to Ignatieff, in the terms of psychopathology. Now there is actually a partly legitimate and important point here about national bonds being tied to concerns for self-protection in truly dire situations, but then certainly from the side of those who assert nationalism defensively, there is something very real which they may be seizing on as a point of commonality and protection with others. So for such situations and all the more for those in which nationalism is nourished by much less than the most extreme of fears, any suggestion that nationalism rests on a form of imagining which amounts to systematic distortion is a combination of unwarranted and unhelpful. (Against Ignatieff’s view, there is the further fact that nationalism is (more) often the cause rather than the effect of disintegrating regimes.)

Goodin gets at something else:

National and other communities are, quite literally, constituted by the conjunction of a certain story about where we as a People come from and a story about where each of us individually sprang from that makes us part of that People. (McKim and McMahan, P. 97)

This seems right and to echo things often said about nationalism. But what Goodin goes on to say brings our current question to a head. For Goodin claims that what matters about the story of the past is that it be conventionally agreed on however arbitrary it may be: “If the choice of histories is largely arbitrary, it is nonetheless crucial that everyone claiming to be one People by virtue of a shared history and lineage settle on the same story” (p. 97).

I take this to be a seriously erroneous conception, albeit one which, as I have been seeking to show, a number of theorists either espouse or come close to espousing.

Much ground can be properly plotted here by sorting out in sequence four points: (1) It is characteristic of social phenomena in general that they be in part constituted by beliefs, ideas, and the like. This is true of roles (parent, police officer, teacher), institutions (banks, unions), symbols and celebrations (flags, holidays), and so forth. They exist in part by virtue of people acting in accord with certain understandings and intentions. As such, the roles, institutions, and symbols are certainly as real elements of our world as anything of the
kind could or should be. Why not also nations? My point indeed is that there is no reason in general why they should be denied real status by virtue of being formed out of conceptions people have about themselves and others and about their shared past, future aims, and so forth. (See Michael Walzer, “The New Tribalism,” in Beiner, p. 207.) Certainly, without the individuals that make them up, there would be no nation or other things of the sort. They are social realities, or at least can be: particular instances must be judged on their merits—which leads to the next point. (2) The ideas and beliefs which constitute nations and nationalism and which are nurtured by traditions necessarily contain a measure of interpretation and not simple observation of physical properties; interpretation involves, in essence, linking elements by relations of meaning. But interpretation is not the same as mere invention, fabrication, or freewheeling subjective variation. There may be different views about the significance of a past event or even about just what happened, but as with interpretation generally, facts (and logic) can constrain and be used to test differing views for their reliability and consistency. This is not to say that the evaluations are going to be simple or always decisive but only that they are possible and normal to the phenomena at issue. (3) Indeed, there is an important control or check on nationalist beliefs as a consequence of nationalism having to be part of a modern world in which certain standards of empirical validity and intersubjective testing have come to be accepted. The modern world is infused by scientific modes of reasoning and of assessing evidence, and these can only be rejected or disregarded at the cost of extreme cognitive dissonance; there can be no license to hold beliefs which fly in the face of science and amount to mere historical myth making presented as factual truth. This leaves significant room for embellished historical accounts, tales of great deeds, formative events, and the like. But invented pasts as in the sagas of the ancients are simply not legitimate options now, no matter how frequently they may be offered and accepted. For these reasons, as Hobsbawm and others have pointed out, solid academic history and sociology are always liable to be subversive, in the noble sense, of nationalist claims. (4) The indicated objective grounds for testing the epistemic merit of nationalist assumptions and claims is linked to a moral basis for scrutinizing them. For typically—although by no means always or necessarily—the nationalisms which have done the most damage are those which have been the most given to not just interpretation but outright invention and the general sway of unreason. That tendency is to be expected, for often the motive and in any
case the effect of the most irrational nationalisms has been to deny the reality and actual characteristics of some persons, whole categories of persons, or of crucial facts, which the truth would require it to confront.

Indeed, to the extent that strong political and intellectual traditions adapted to modernity (individualism, market-economies, citizenship encompassing social diversity) are absent, there may be an inclination to make ethnicity and blood the determining thing, as with Germany and Nazism. Lacking a real history evincing a political orientation (of influence) in the modern era, some German nationalists made up a false history from the distant past based on race and ancient militarism. This is testimony again not to the determining power of circumstances but to the importance of nourishing some traditions and of subjecting others to profound criticism.

4. Civic versus Ethnic Nationalism?

Not surprisingly, many theorists of nationalism have drawn a basic distinction between ethnic or similar nationalism and civic or constitutional nationalism, with the ethnic sort being taken as the paradigm of what is untenable about nationalism or as the troubling sort to be avoided. A number of other theorists, however, have challenged this distinction, although in most cases without really wanting to do away with it entirely. It would in any case be wrong to want to, for even if as often formulated the distinction is flawed and misleading, it gets at something valid and important, namely, that there is a difference between nationalism based on characteristics like race or ethnic group, characteristics not subject to choice and liable always to be exclusive and oppressive of others, and nationalism based instead on legal principles and equal rights, which constitute bonds of common citizenship and which can be open to all whatever their race, religion, ethnic heritage, and so forth. The fact, nonetheless, that birth within a country or to certain parents can be sufficient (but not necessary) for citizenship remains obviously justifiable as a requisite of family unity and political continuity.

Ignatieff, Greenfeld, and Habermas ("The European Nation-State—Its Achievements and Its Limits: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship," in Balakrishnan) are among those who uphold the distinction in question for the purpose of lending support to the calm, limited nationalism which they take civic nationalism to be, while Kymlicka ("Misunderstanding Nationalism," in Beiner),
Kai Nielsen ("Cultural Nationalism, Neither Ethnic nor Civic," in Beiner), Bernard Yack ("The Myth of the Civic Nation," in Beiner), and Neil McCormick ("Nations and Nationalism," in Beiner) are among those who, from different points of view, may want something like the distinction but not as usually proffered.

One essential point that critics of the distinction make is that civic or constitutional nationalism must typically include cultural components, perhaps by way of supplying social bonds that tie the members of the nation to each other and inspire a basic sense of commitment and patriotism and in any case by way of providing the language and idiom in which the laws and policies of the country must be enacted, its business conducted, and its education provided.

As to the point concerning social bonds and patriotism, we should be careful about ascribing to these any great intensity or need for such in normal times and certainly careful about supposing that our fellow citizens need be more than fellow citizens, say ethnically alike, to merit being owed duties and commitments from us: common citizenship in a framework of generally fair rights and rules worth preserving can suffice and anyway somehow must suffice if (as all parties here presume) we are to avoid nasty tribalism.

What then about language being an intermediate factor which indicates that the contrast between ethnic nationalism and civic or constitutional nationalism is too sharp and simple, that by virtue of the factor of language even civic nationalism must be, although not ethnic, in some sense cultural? Part of the answer is a previously made point that language need not carry any significant cultural freight with it. Granted, where a minority language is not that of public institutional life, there may be need for those who do not speak the latter to learn it, and there will be concerns for the viability of a distinctive literature, range of arts, and folkways connected to a minority language. What measures these circumstances may imply we again do best to address in the next section. The query here is whether civic nationalism must include more than what it claims with regard to culture in the broader sense, denoting a set of shared values and orientations or a shared conception of the past.

There is in fact a way in which it must but not such as to be inherently troubling and certainly not such as to be avoidable. Political principles and rights, the content of civic nationalism, must be defined and understood not only by abstract formulations but also by, and in ways primarily by, concrete particulars which focus them and serve as their paradigmatic instances. That implies a cultural compo-
nent for, in general, cultures, as sets of values and aims, exist by being embodied in concrete traditions, and political cultures—which is what sets of elaborated and applied political principles, rights, and dispositions amount to—consist of and must be embodied in political traditions. The reason is that what constitutes a right or principle of any basic sort depends in part on the interpretation given to it and more concretely on the practices and often legal precedents which define it. In this way, the essentially same right may come to have quite different meaning by virtue of different cultural contexts and traditions of precedents. For example, the right of free speech in Canada (and many other countries) is construed so as to prohibit group-oriented hate propaganda on the ground that it is an obstacle to the expression of multiculturalism. So allegiance to or sharing any set of civic principles, such as (a version of) liberal principles, involves allegiance to a possible and typically to an actual selection of embodiments of them. Of course, the embodiments must be seen as, at best, imperfect and open to criticism—by reference to their own inherent momentum and implication as compared to their actual implementation and by reference to other traditions which take different paths. (So it is of course debated whether a prohibition on hate propaganda is a consistent application of Canadian and democratic commitments and values.) But all this just confirms that if the notion of civic nationalism is to be meaningful, it must include reference to a past, or conception of the past, in which certain acts, decisions, events, and the like are seen as manifesting or defining bearings for rights and principles.

There is a residual worry about this, well focused by Weinstock (1996), with regard to what may happen over time to any conception of civic nationalism, especially in the face of immigration. Immigrants, he suggests, cannot be expected to identify in any strong way with supposedly formative, value-defining events in a country’s past (for instance, the Glorious Revolution in England). True enough, but, again, the need is merely to recognize that it is in and through a conception of the past that a country’s current commitments will be understood and even debated. In this sense, civic nationalism, a kind of cultural orientation which liberal-democratic countries can be expected to seek to cultivate, can be a basis for claims of historical responsibility and rectification as much as for self-definition or celebration. Indeed, that space and option for debate and dissent is one key difference between the prospect of civic nationalism as liberal and democratic and very different alternatives; for, as a number of authors
have pointed out, if civic nationalism simply means nonethnic nationalism, then some (military) dictatorships can be instances, which is evidently opposite to what supporters of the idea intend.

5. Liberal Nationalism?

Liberalism is above all a theory of individual rights and equal citizenship. As we have seen, at times because of theoretical blinkers to cultural bearings but at times because of sound moral misgivings, liberalism in the past has often been opposed to nationalism; and the indications of our analysis to this point are that any new sensitivity to the dimension of culture must be balanced by those misgivings so that an embrace of nationalism by liberalism must be limited at best. Actually, the two concerns, the explanatory and the normative, may converge in that direction, or so I would suggest.

For, first, in line with our response to the previous question, we must emphasize something which a number of commentators on nationalism have rightly noted: although much damage has been done to liberal aims by nations and in the name of nationalism, it remains true that to the extent—significant on balance—that liberal ideals of individual rights and equal citizenship have been implemented and secured, this has occurred within and not apart from strong “nation-states” or their kind (Yack, in Beiner, p. 115). The reason of course is that these states arose partly in opposition to prior political systems which gave privileged status to royalty and nobility and to the members of some particular faith or even race. The end of the ancien régime and other such structures was marked by the forging (slowly, over time) of a new category of citizen, a category denoting equal rights and common status. But this of course meant as French, Swiss, English, American, and so forth. Nationality in that sense is supposed to convey not the denial of difference but the accommodation of it.

And now, nationality in that sense has been challenged on precisely the grounds that it fails to be fully accommodating of legitimate cultural differences and that without certain special measures it will continue to fail thus—hence the message of multiculturalism as the model for liberal societies or of renewed and more particularist national claims based on liberalism.

Will Kymlicka (1995) has developed the most detailed arguments for a range of special measures to protect minority cultures, arguments premised on individual rights but also on the need of persons
for a context of meaningful value choice, which is what he takes it dis-
tinctive “societal cultures” provide and which the dominant culture,
as one such, thus makes available to the majority in a host of often
unrecognized ways. Kymlicka intends his stronger measurers for
indigenous national minorities rather than immigrant groups for
whom the aim and reasonable expectation, he holds, is integration, a
goal which nonetheless justifies, he believes, significant accommoda-
tions and support for cultural observances. For national minorities,
what may be needed and justified, depending on the circumstances, is
a degree of political autonomy or special recognition—and only fail-
ing that outright, sovereignty. Yael Tamir (1993; “Theoretical Diffi-
culties in the Study of Nationalism,” in Beiner; “Pro Patria Mori!: Death and the State,” in McKim and McMahan) also seeks to make the
case for liberal nationalism by uncoupling nationality from the requi-
site for separate statehood but insists that every national culture
deserves a context in which it can be in the majority. And Michael
Walzer maintains that while ensuring individual liberties, we should
recognize the importance of forms of collective identity and also the
varying nature, circumstances, and needs of these and so aim at “pro-
tected spaces of many different sorts matched to the needs of the dif-
ferent tribes,” by which he means “nations, ethnic groups, religious
communities,” and the options include allowing parochial schools,
measures of political autonomy, and outright separation (“The New
Tribalism: Notes on a Difficult Problem,” in Beiner, pp. 213, 212; see
also “The Politics of Difference: Statehood and Toleration in a Multi-
cultural World,” in McKim and McMahan).

It is neither feasible nor necessary here to examine specifics of the
above theories, especially since the volumes under discussion contain
only limited accounts of them, although also critiques of them based
on the developed accounts elsewhere. Before sampling the critiques,
let me focus a general position to which I shall return in conclusion: I
take it that some significant accommodations to multiculturalism and
to the claims of more than one language for public life can and should
be made, consistent with liberalism (and in countries like Canada
have already been made in large measure). But it matters whether the
truer liberal model is that of the more inclusive and still strong whole
or that of some decentralized version of it. I believe that the former
model must be favored. Relevant to that issue and anyway important
are the various criticisms posed for one or another of the liberal
nationalists by Judith Lichtenberg (“How Liberal Can Nationalism
Be?” in Beiner; also “Nationalism, for and (Mainly) against,” in
McKim and McMahan), Brian Walker (“Modernity and Cultural Vulnerability: Should Ethnicity be Privileged?” in Beiner), Bhikhu Parekh (“The Incoherence of Nationalism,” in Beiner), and others, such as the following:

- There is (again) the issue of language vis-à-vis culture and of slides from one to the other in arguments on these matters; the two may coincide but need not.
- There are multiple aspects to the self and to identity, of which nationality is at most one significant element and for many people not a central one at all.
- Immigrants as compared to national minorities at times seem to have powerful claims for cultural preservation; so, for that matter, do regions and ways of life within a country. All of this suggests that multiculturalists/liberal nationalists must draw arbitrary lines or face an endless proliferation.
- The element of commonness within supposed cultural minorities tends often to be exaggerated and to support the doubtful inference that there is a way of life or set of values, meanings, and orientations which risks extinction and should be supported; the actual result may be to privilege a particular contested one and insulate it against change.
- While arguments for accommodations and group rights are made by liberal nationalists with the assurance or insistence that they will not come at the cost of basic individual rights (in matters of dissent, fair representation, treatment of women, etc.), it is at the least controversial in many instances whether or how that can actually be so.

As to more general indications and tendencies concerning links between liberalism and nationalism, I would say the following. First, where a group has been subject to oppression or significant injustice because of its ethnic, linguistic, or even religious character and where the only realistic remedy is some form of political power in the hands of that subject people, then certainly claims on the basis of nationalism are consistent with liberalism and democracy. Such people are entitled to and in need of if not a state then some substantial form of political autonomy or control by which they may escape the subjugation. But this applies in cases in which significant injustice is at issue. By extension, it applies in lesser measure where groups (would) face majority-imposed, historically entrenched obstacles to effective public participation, for which the remedy is, say, official bilingualism or special religious and cultural accommodations. But things become different when the issue is the political one of a desire for collective self-determination in and of itself.
Demands for political self-determination in contexts where rights of equal citizenship and effective public participation obtain can be the instrument by which any group which objects to responsible legal judgments or legitimate majority decisions or general demographic or other trends seeks to have its own way or go its own way—a prospect which is neither politically realistic nor democratically desirable; what it portends is a refusal to live with equality, diversity, or change. (The premise of respecting difference may become in practice the attempt to live in a protected world of intolerance.) This relates to a second concern about liberalism. Since liberalism is in principle committed to rights and equality for persons regardless of race, religion, ethnic background, gender, and so forth, and since the laws and policies for this, and also for measures of distributive justice and social welfare associated with liberalism, can only realistically be implemented and ensured by a government spanning a significant stretch of territory and encompassing diverse regions, groups, and so forth, for these reasons, liberalism, I suggest, should be on the side of democracies which take the form of strong central governments: ideally, federal in structure, flexible in administration, and open to accommodations but guaranteeing (and judicially ensuring) basic individual rights and equality of treatment. That is, liberalism should not as a general alternative opt for the primacy of regional or decentralized governments or extensive devolution from the federal level; these things have their due measure. The principle is that democratic diversity and individual rights (especially for persons in minorities) are best protected under a broad umbrella or aegis. This lesson is a more distinctive one than that above about the emergence of modern states.

And there is a further implication. Seen in one way, it is the issue of the unity of the social whole in the face of increasing claims that persons may rightly identify with only parts or corners of it. Seen in another way, it is the issue, once more, of the connection among nations, states, and cultural orientations. For, as some authors have stressed, whether a given nationalist movement is likely to remain on liberal and democratic ground seems chiefly a function of whether it arises and develops in conditions in which the structures and values of liberal individualism are already solidly entrenched. This sort of dependency is what we should expect given the role we have stressed throughout of culture and traditions in shaping outcomes. But there is another side to that same coin, whereby it is crucial to stress yet again
that liberalism (or liberal democracy) is itself a distinctive culture and tradition, or set of traditions, which needs to be reinforced. This is to say that there is cause for worry when what is proposed for being developed within it is a set of limited enclaves which pull away from the framework on which liberal democracy has been built.

NOTES

1. In his useful introductory essay to *Theorizing Nationalism*, R. Beiner also catalogues five questions. Our lists overlap but do not quite coincide. He includes two questions which I do not itemize as such but mean in effect to cover concerning the idea of self-determination and concerning the “existential attractiveness” (Beiner’s phrase) of nationalism. He does not list my questions 1 and 3. Two issues I shall not address (except indirectly) because they involve special complexities and deserve separate consideration are secession and the question of what duties of aid members of one nation/country owe those of another. Both issues are discussed in various essays in the volumes under discussion.

2. Consider also the following from Gellner:

   The theories of accountable, participatory, limited, plural etcetera government, which anticipated, accompanied or ratified the political changes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, did not possess an agreed coherent theory concerning the precise nature and limits of the unit which was to be endowed with government. Society was to be democratic: but just which society was it to be? This question was not yet at the centre of attention. That there were indeed societies was something taken for granted; the question was just how they were to be run, on what principles and under whose rule, rather than precisely how they were to be delimited.

   In the course of the nineteenth century, history gave an answer to a question which had hardly been asked—what exactly are the units which are to be endowed with government? It turned out to be—nations. (“The Coming of Nationalism and Its Interpretation: The Myths of Nation and Class,” in Balakrishnan, pp. 114-15)

3. See also Hall and Jarvie (1996), which contains, along with much else, essays on Gellner’s theory of nationalism by Brendan O’Leary, Kenneth Minogue, Anthony D. Smith, Michael Mann, and Nicholas Stargardt, plus, importantly, Gellner’s “Reply to Critics,” a portion of which (pp. 623-63) addresses these essays on nationalism. As well, there is (Gellner 1997) a brief posthumously published volume which covers much the same ground as the essay by Gellner in Balakrishnan.

4. Hroch, who has focused especially on Balkan nationalism (for a sample, see “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe,” in Balakrishnan, and “Real and Constructed,” The Nature of the Nation,” in Hall), looks to economic-political crises and the collapses of states as spawning nationalism. However, as I believe Gellner rightly counters, Hroch, in a neo-Marxist vein, continues to construe the sources of things overly much in class terms.

5. On this, see also Miller 1995.
REFERENCES


